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Abstract—Information-centric networking (ICN) is a popular
research topic. At its heart is the concept of in-network caching.
Various algorithms have been proposed for optimising ICN
caching, many of which rely on collaborative principles, i.e. mul-
tiple caches interacting to decide what to store. Past work has
assumed altruistic nodes that will sacrifice their own performance
for the global optimum. We argue that this assumption is flawed.
We address this problem by modelling the in-network caching
problem as a Nash bargaining game. We develop optimal and
heuristic caching solutions that consider both performance and
fairness. We argue that only algorithms that are fair to all parties
will encourage engagement and cooperation. Through extensive
simulations, we show our heuristic solution, FairCache, ensures
that all collaborative caches achieve performance gains without
undermining the performance of others.
Index Terms—Information-centric networking, network proto-
cols, resources allocation, game theory, algorithm design, optimi-
sation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) [1], [2] has been
proposed to exploit the observation that much of today’s
Internet traffic is content distribution. ICN replaces the existing
location-based Internet model with a content request/response
model. One feature this enables is the capacity to cache
content within the network. Whereas initial ICN caching
approaches used traditional algorithms (e.g. Least Recently
Used), there has been a number of novel proposals that attempt
to specifically target ICN environments. These algorithms
exploit things like inter-AS cooperation, request prediction and
a priori topology maps to optimise performance [3]–[5].
A key outcome of this work has been the observation that
collaborative caching usually outperforms locally optimised
algorithms [5]–[8]. This is primarily caused by the nature
of ubiquitous ICN caching, where nearby caches will often
wastefully store the same objects [7]. To address this, a simple
collaborative algorithm might involve two nodes strategically
caching distinct objects [4], [9], [10]. Cache collaboration
is therefore likely to play a role in any future ICN deploy-
ments [11]. In tandem, we are witnessing a fragmentation of
cache ownership in the Internet, with large operators deploying
separate infrastructures. Some of these providers exclusively
host their own content (e.g. Google, Netflix), whilst other
aggregate content from multiple sources (e.g. Akamai, Chi-
naCache). This adds an extra layer of complexity as its means
that, even on an intra-domain level, we may begin to see
multiple competing stakeholders operating caches within a
single network. This will likely be accelerated by the growth
of network function virtualisation, which will allow anybody
to “spin up” caches within a network (we already see the
availability of virtual cache services, e.g. Fortinet Virtual
Cache). Hence, ensuring the cache collaboration can also work
in this setting will become increasingly important.
A more extreme example of this fragmentation is within
the expanding number of wireless community mesh networks,
e.g. Guifi [12]; these are deployed by groups of individuals
who each contribute wireless routers (e.g. mounted on their
property). In a community network, every router/cache is
operated by a separate individual. Hence, we predict that
future ICNs will use caches that are provisioned not just
by network operators, but also various distinct stakeholders
at strategic locations. These observations, however, have the
potential to undermine the key tenets of caching in ICNs:
What if caches operated by separate entities pursue policies
that do not include collaboration, the storage of competitor’s
content or the serving of specific users? This is currently the
situation online today, and it is unlikely to change with the
advent of ICN. Despite this, most ICN collaborative algorithm
assumes altruistic nodes that simply strive to reach a global
optimum [4], [5], [7], [8], [10], [13]–[15]. Whereas this is
acceptabe in scenarios where a single organisation operates
all caches, it ceases to be suitable in inter-domain scenarios
or cases where caches in a single network are operated by
multiple (third party) providers.
The reasons why a non-collaborative policy may be im-
plemented are diverse. However, in this paper, we explore
the topic from a utilitarian perspective. Intuitively, caches
would wish to engage in a collaborative algorithm if they
attain greater utility than if they were not to engage. This
observation mandates some concept of fairness, where ben-
efits are spread fairly across caches, and individuals are not
expected to sacrifice personal performance by collaborating.
Imagine, for instance, the above community network example;
an individual who sees his/her own performance consistently
detrimented by collaboration would (rationally) cease. We
therefore argue that collaboration should be based on fairness,
which may or may not reduce global performance. While
a global optimum sounds attractive, we argue it is more
important, from a practical perspective, that every node is
better off by collaborating together than working alone. In
this paper, we design a collaborative caching algorithm that
embraces both high performance and fairness. Our focus is not
to build a protocol that forces nodes to collaborate, or provides
protection against malicious behaviour but, rather, to design
underlying algorithms that can fairly share cache space across
trusted collaborators. We first formulate the fair in-network
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2caching problem as a Nash bargaining game (§III) before
describing optimal algorithms for allocating objects to caches
(§IV). We then propose a heuristic collaborative caching
algorithm (§V) with fairness at its core: FairCache. Through
extensive simulations, we show that FairCache achieves in
excess of 90% accuracy compared to the optimal solution, at
a fraction of the overheads (§VII). Importantly, we show that,
when using FairCache, all nodes improve their performance
via cooperation. It can be deployed across small subsets of
collaborating caches or, alternatively, globally without change
to design. We conclude by extracting key lessons learnt (§X).
II. MOTIVATION AND SYSTEM MODEL
To underpin our design, we begin with a motivational
example before outlining our system model. For convenience,
Table I contains the notations used throughout the paper.
A. Motivational Example
We use the simple toy caching system described in Figure 1
as a motivating example. Imagine two routers with a cache
capacity of one object. They each serve a nearby set of users
and, consequently, it is desirable that they collaborate to decide
which objects should be cached (e.g. to avoid storing the same
object). To decide which object to store, the caches locally
inspect the request rates they receive, depicted in Figure 1
(as a Demand Matrix). Intuitively, each cache would wish to
selfishly optimise some concept of individual “utility”. For
simplicity, we measure their utility as the number of cache hits
they get. We also allow nodes to redirect requests to the other
cache; if a hit is attained there, a utility of 0.5 is given to the
node performing the redirect (factored down due to the extra
delay, overhead etc.). We consider three caching strategies:
Case 1: Greedy Strategy, where each cache locally and
selfishly optimises its performance. As our comparison base-
line, Greedy strategy is a perfect LFU that keeps track of
all the objects. Cache 1 chooses to hold A since it is the
most popular content of demand 90, which leads to U1 =
90 + 312 = 105.5. Similarly, Cache 2 caches B which leads
to U2 = 83 + 52 = 85.5. Therefore, we have the aggregated
utility UTotal = U1 + U2 = 105.5 + 85.5 = 191.
Case 2: Global Strategy, where each cache tries to maximise
the aggregated utility UTotal of the whole system. By caching
C and D on Cache 1 and 2 respectively, UTotal reaches its
theoretical maximum, namely UTotal = 126+85 = 211. How-
ever, if we examine the individual performance and compare
them to the Greedy Strategy, we notice that the increase in
utility for Cache 1 results in a utility decrease for Cache 2.
Case 3: Fair Strategy, where caches attempt to collaborate
fairly, in a way that does not reduce utility for any party. Cache
1 stores E and Cache 2 stores F . Although this does not
achieve the global optimum (i.e. the aggregated utility UTotal
drops from 211 to 208.5), it ensures that both caches improve
their respective performance whilst also improving upon the
local Greedy Strategy. This solution is Pareto efficient, and
ensures both parties are incentivised.
The above reveals a stark mismatch. Attaining a global op-
timum often disadvantages some parties [16]. Thus, nodes that
U2 = 83+5/2 = 85.5
B
U1 = 90+31/2 = 105.5 
UTotal = 191 Greedy
Object Requests at Cache 1
Requests at 
Cache 2
A 90 5
B 31 83
C 86 50
D 80 60
E 82 54
F 67 66
Demand Matrix
A
U2 = 60+50/2 = 85
D
U1 = 86+80/2 = 126 
UTotal = 211 Global
C
U2 = 66+54/2 = 93
F
U1 = 82+67/2 = 115.5 
UTotal = 208.5 Fair
E
Cache 1
Cache 1
Cache 1
Cache 2
Cache 2
Cache 2
Fig. 1: A mini caching system with two caches and six objects.
Three strategies (Greedy, Global and Fair) are presented.
Notation Meaning
G = (V,E) a graph G of node set V and edge set E
O content set, ok represents the kth item
O′ a reduced content set of O by removing unpopular items
s sk is the size of the kth content item ok
w demand matrix, wi,k is the demand of ok on vi
U utility vector, Ui is the utility of node vi
u0 initial disagreement vector, u0i is the disagreement value of vi
x xi,k represents the decision whether vi caches ok locally
y yi,j,k represents the decision whether vi retrieves ok from vj
Ω solution space of all caching games, Ωe is the Pareto frontier
Ψ solution space of all fair caching games
λ dual variable associated with the constraint (7): yi,j,k ≤ xj,k
L(·) Lagrangian associated with the objective function (4)
d(·) Lagrangian dual function of the objective function (4)
h(·) subgradient of the dual function d(·)
Φ overall communication complexity at system level
Ni neighbourhood of vi, average size is denoted as |N |
N+i set of nodes having vi in their neighbourhoods
r average search radius, ri uniquely defines Ni of vi
n1, n2 average size of one-hop and two-hop neighbourhood
t current iteration index while running subgradient descent
ξ ξt is the step size of a subgradient algorithm at iteration t
θ′, θ current utility improvement and the stopping threshold
TABLE I: Table of main notation used in the paper
are unfairly exploited by other caches’ redirects (at the cost of
their own performance) are unlikely to continue collaboration:
Caching should balance the need for high performance against
the need for fair usage across caches.
B. System Model
We model the network as a graph, G = (V,E), where V is
the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. V could consist of all
caches in a network or, alternatively, a subset of collaborating
partners. These could be owned by one or more separate
organisations. We follow an NDN [1] model, whereby hosts
generate requests that get deterministically routed to sources
that reply with content objects. Each node in the network,
vi ∈ V , is equipped with cache of size Ci. We denote O
as the global set of content objects. For each ok ∈ O, we
associate two parameters: sk, which is the object size and
wi,k, which is its aggregated demand (requests per second)
observed from all the clients connected to vi. We focus on
a subcategory of caching: collaborative algorithms. Because
of resource constraints, we assume that nodes are limited in
the number of nearby nodes they can cooperate with. We
3use ri to represent vi’s search radius measured in hops. ri
defines a neighbourhood for each vi, which we denote as
Ni = {vj |l∗i,j ≤ ri,∀vj ∈ V, vi 6= vj}, where l∗i,j measures
the length of the shortest path between vi and vj .
A collaborative caching algorithm can be decomposed into
“caching decisions” and “retrieval decisions”. These two parts
solve “what to cache” and “where to fetch”. The latter is
necessary to allow nodes to redirect requests to other caches
(opposed to forwarding it along the default route to the original
source). This means that caches that do not locally store an
object retain the flexibility to exploit objects stored elsewhere
(i.e. collaboration). To model such a caching strategy, we use
two vector decision variables: x and y. xi,k ∈ {0, 1} denotes
whether vi caches ok, and yi,j,k ∈ {0, 1},∀i 6= j denotes
whether vi retrieves the object ok from vj . Formally, we say:
Definition 1. A caching strategy for a network G is a tuple
of functions (x,y) where x : V × O → {0, 1} and y : V ×
V × O → {0, 1}. The family of all such tuples is denoted as
Ψ, which represents the whole space of all caching strategies.
Definition 2. A caching strategy for a node vi is defined as
(xi,yi), where xi : {vi} × O → {0, 1} and yi : {vi} × V ×
O → {0, 1} are the partial functions of x and y with domains
restricted to {vi} ×O and {vi} × V ×O respectively.
Note that × above represents the Cartesian product. We
strive for a caching strategy that is (i) Pareto efficient; (ii) has
well-defined fairness achieved amongst the nodes; and (iii) at-
tains high performance. From a utilitarian perspective, this
combination of attributes will lead to stable cooperation.
III. FUNDAMENTALS OF BARGAINING GAMES
A bargaining game is a model for analysing how par-
ties collaborate to obtain certain utility values. We model
collaborative caching as a bargaining game, in which we
aim to achieve both high performance (utility) and fairness.
Ideally, a solution is considered fair if it satisfies certain
axioms [17], [18]: (i) Pareto optimality; (ii) Scale invariance;
(iii) Symmetry; (iv) Independence of the irrelevant alternatives;
(v) Monotonicity. Nash proved that there is one unique solution
which satisfies axiom (i)-(iv), termed the Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) [17]. The NBS can be extended to multiple
players. On the other hand, the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
(KS) [18] satisfies axiom (i)-(iii)and (v). These two solutions
lead to two fairness metrics. Compared to NBS, KS often does
not have a closed-form expression. Hence, we focus on NBS.
A. Game Definitions
In game theory, each node attempts to optimise its personal
“utility”. In caching, utility for a node, Ui, can be measured by
the delay to respond to a client. Each cache aims to serve its
clients with the lowest possible delay. Consequently, serving
a request from the local cache produces the greatest utility,
but redirecting a request to another nearby neighbour also
increases it (rather than forwarding to the original source).
As such, a selfish cache strives to maximise its utility through
a combination of local caching and redirects to nearby neigh-
bours.1 Of course, if utility can be maximised solely through
local caching then a node will cease to collaborate. NBS is an
axiomatic solution for solving the following problem:
max
∏
vi∈V
(Ui − u0i ) (1)
Eq. (1) is called the Nash product. As mentioned, Ui is
node i’s utility. u0i is the initial disagreement value of i.
The disagreement value is defined as the worst utility payoff
a node would accept for collaboration. In practice, a node
sets its disagreement value to the maximum value achieved
by optimising locally as a standalone cache, e.g. using Least
Recent Used. In the following, we give the formal definition
of our in-network caching game and its solution.
Definition 3. An in-network caching game is a tuple (Ω,u0),
where Ω ⊂ R|V | contains all the utility values obtainable via
collaboration, and u0 ⊂ R|V | contains all the disagreement
values leading to a negotiation breakdown.
Let Ωe ⊂ Ω be the Pareto frontier of set Ω, i.e. the potential
Pareto efficient solutions. We assume that Ωe is also a concave
function with a closed compact convex domain. A game is
considered fair iff its outcome is fair. Therefore, we have:
Definition 4. A fair caching game is a game (Ω,u0) with a
Nash bargaining solution, i.e. a function f : Ωe → Ψ such
that f(Ω,u0) = (x,y) uniquely maximises
∏
vi∈V (Ui − u0i ).
By taking the logarithm of the objective function (1), we
have ln(max
∏
vi∈V (Ui − u0i )) = max ln(
∏
vi∈V (Ui − u0i )).
By taking the negation, NBS can be obtained equivalently by:
max
∑
vi∈V
ln(Ui − u0i ) =⇒ min
∑
vi∈V
− ln(Ui − u0i ). (2)
B. Fairness Definitions
We argue that collaboration should follow the intuitive
concept of fairness, such that all caches receive fair utility
improvements through collaboration. This is critical to ensure
that node owners do not feel exploited and do not disengage
from the collaboration. Being Pareto efficient, alone, does not
achieve this. To attain fairness, it is necessary to formalise the
concept. Three well-defined fairness metrics are often referred
to in the literature [19]–[21], i.e. Egalitarian (EF), Max-min
(MF) and Proportional (PF) fairness. EF pursues an equal
amount of improvement on every node, which usually creates
Pareto inefficiency (and is thus seldom used in practice). Both
MF and PF have axiomatic foundations and are widely used,
e.g. in traffic engineering. MF is a generalisation of KS, while
PF is a generalisation of NBS. Thus, we only focus on PF:
Definition 5. Proportional Fairness (PF): A caching strategy
(x∗,y∗) is PF iff ∀(x,y) 6= (x∗,y∗)⇒∑vi∈V Ui−U∗iU∗i −u0i < 0.
A cache allocation is considered PF if the re-allocation of
any object would decrease the proportional utility gain (from
1Here, we assume that each individual node selfishly optimises. However,
our model can also support collective self interest amongst multiple nodes,
e.g. if several caches are owned by a single organisation.
4collaboration) of a node by less than the respective aggregated
increase for others. For example, imagine an object is re-
allocated from Cache 1 to Cache 2. It would not be fair if this
re-allocation reduces Cache 1’s utility by 20%, so that Cache
2 could increase its utility by just 3%. However, it would be
considered fair if Cache 2 could increase its utility by 60%.
Importantly, to be considered PF (and to incentivise uptake),
it is necessary for all caches to improve their performance
over local optimisation (e.g. Least Recently Used). Otherwise
collaboration would immediately breakdown in favour of local
algorithms. If this were to occur, each node would simply
select its own preferred algorithm (e.g. LRU). However, in our
caching games, PF is guaranteed by NBS (the proof is trivial
and available in [22]). It is also trivial to show whenever a
Pareto efficient solution achieves EF, it also achieves MF, i.e. a
fair solution achieves all three fairness metrics in NBS given
it is EF. We later show that being collaborative brings benefits
to almost all nodes, indicating that the number of (rational)
nodes who would revert to a local algorithm are very limited.
IV. SOLVING A FAIR IN-NETWORK CACHING GAME
We next devise both centralised and decentralised optimal
solutions for achieving fair caching. We later use these to eval-
uate our heuristic solution, FairCache. We avoid presenting all
the standard mathematical details but rather focus on the key
mechanisms (remaining are available in [22]).
A. Defining a Utility Function
In this paper, we assume that a cache’s utility is generated
from serving its users’ demand with low delay. For edge
nodes, this demand comes directly from clients, whereas for
core nodes this comes from their downstream customers. In
either case, utility could be improved by a router using its
local cache, or by redirecting a request to a nearby collabo-
rative cache. Both improve delay compared to following the
deterministic route to the origin. More precisely, vi’s utility is
defined as:
Ui =
∑
ok∈O
skwi,kxi,k +
∑
ok∈O
∑
vj∈Ni
skwi,k
l∗i,j + 1
yi,j,k (3)
Both terms show that the utility is a non-decreasing function
of demand and content size. The second term shows that the
utility of retrieving remote content decreases as the distance
increases. It indicates that a node prefers fetching from the
closest source to reduce latency and traffic footprint. Although
this affine utility function is used throughout the paper, any
other metric (e.g. bandwidth) or affine function can be used
to model the utility without change to our model.
B. Centralised Solution
We begin by outlining the optimal solution, which can
be computed centrally (e.g. on a controller). Without loss
of generality, we assume unit object size sk = 1,2 also let
2In practice, object size could either be varied per-object or, alternatively,
objects can be separated into smaller fixed size units
li,j , l∗i,j +1 for simplicity of expression. Plugging in Eq. (3)
and Eq. (2), we define the optimisation problem as:
min
∑
vi∈V
− ln(
∑
ok∈O
wi,kxi,k +
∑
ok∈O
∑
vj∈Ni
wi,k
li,j
yi,j,k − u0i ).
(4)
Subject to ∑
ok∈O
xi,k ≤ Ci, ∀vi ∈ V (5)∑
vj∈Ni
yi,j,k ≤ 1, ∀vi ∈ V,∀ok ∈ O (6)
yi,j,k ≤ xj,k, ∀vi, vj ∈ V, ok ∈ O (7)
xi,k ∈ {0, 1}, ∀vi ∈ V, ok ∈ O (8)
yi,j,k ∈ {0, 1}, ∀vi, vj ∈ V, ok ∈ O (9)
Constraint (5) means the content stored at a node cannot
exceed its cache capacity. Constraint (6) simplifies the data
scheduling and avoids requesting redundant content by con-
straining a node to retrieve a maximum of one complete object
in a cache period. Constraint (7) says vi can retrieve ok from
vj only if vj has cached it; it also says vi cannot get more
than vj can offer. Constraints (8) and (9) impose the domain
of decision variables.
The above optimisation problem is a typical Integer Pro-
gramming program which is NP-Complete. By applying Lin-
ear Programming relaxation, we relax constraints (8) and (9)
by letting xi,k ∈ [0, 1] and yi,j,k ∈ [0, 1]. We later round
up/down xi,k and yi,j,k to construct caching strategies. Such
relaxation renders a suboptimal solution hence is considered as
the lower bound of the actual performance. Regarding Eq. (4),
since all the affine functions are log-concave, their composite
with logarithmic functions preserves concavity. Thus, the
problem (4) becomes a convex optimisation problem defined
over a set of compact and convex constraints as Lemma 1
shows, which leads to the unique Pareto efficient solution,
which is trivially followed by the existence of the equilibrium
in NBS by definition [17].
Lemma 1. The problem (4) is a convex optimisation problem.
The centralised solution can be derived by applying standard
convex optimisation techniques (see [22]). The solver needs
the demand matrix of each cache, cache size, content object
set, whole network topology etc. as inputs. The whole equation
system has 3|O| · |V |2+2|O| · |V |+ |V | variables and the same
number of equations.
Theorem 1. In a fair collaborative game, for the optimal
caching strategy (x∗i ,y
∗
i ) of node vi, there exist non-negative
vectors α  0, β  0, γ  0, δ  0 and λ  0, such that
x∗i,k =
1
αi + γi,k −
∑
vj∈N+i λj,i,k
− τi,k
wi,k
(10)
y∗i,j,k =
1
λi,j,k + βi,k − δi,k −
li,jτ
′
i,k
wi,j
(11)
where τi,k = Ui−u0i−wi,kxi,k and τ ′i,k = Ui−u0i−wi,kli,j yi,j,k.
The centralised solution can be easily derived by applying
standard convex optimisation techniques, as its closed form
5expression shown in Theorem 1. The proof and actual equation
system can be found in appendix. In practice, we can choose
any modern LP solver to calculate the solution, but the
computation of solving such a large system is non-trivial.
C. Distributed Solution
The optimal centralised solution has obvious drawbacks in
its actual use: (i) it suffers from high computation complexity;
(ii) it creates a single point of failure; and (iii) it is not adaptive
under network dynamics. Hence, we next translate it into a
distributed solution using decomposition techniques.
To solve an equation system, each node can be viewed
as a subsystem. If they simply optimise locally, all the cal-
culations in each subsystem are independent from those in
others. However, due to collaboration, there are variables and
constraints, which are referred to as complicating variables
and constraints [23]. These make calculations interdependent
and couple a subsystem with others. In problem (4), the only
complicating constraint is (7).
To decompose Eq. (4), we apply Lagrangian dual relaxation.
Lagrangian dual relaxation provides a non-trivial lower-bound
of a primal. The difference between the dual and the primal is
called the duality gap, which can be zero if certain conditions
are met as we show below. The Lagrangian L(·) : R2|O||V |2 →
R associated with objective (4) is defined as follows:
L(x,y,λ) (12)
=
∑
vi∈V
[− ln(Ui − u0i ) +
∑
vj∈Ni
∑
ok∈O
λi,j,k(yi,j,k − xj,k)].
λ  0 is the dual variable associated with constraint (7)
of objective function (4). Then the Lagrangian dual function
d(·) : R|O||V |2 → R is as follows:
d(λ) = inf
x∈X,y∈Y
L(x,y,λ). (13)
Given λ, let x∗ and y∗ be the unique minimizers for the
Lagrangian (12) over all x and y. Then the dual function (13)
can be rewritten as d(λ) = L(x∗,y∗,λ). By maximising the
dual function, we can reduce the duality gap. The Lagrangian
dual problem of the primal (4) is defined as:
max
λ∈R|O||V |2
d(λ) = L(x∗,y∗,λ). (14)
The constraints for the dual are the same as those of the primal
except constraint (7) which has already been included in the
dual objective function (14). Because (4) is convex and all the
constraints (5)(6)(8) and (9) are affine, Slater’s condition holds
given a solution exists, and the duality gap is zero. Thus, when
the dual (14) reaches its maximum, the primal also reaches its
minimum. The optimal solution for primal problem (4) can be
derived from the optimal solution for dual problem (14).
After decomposition, each node vi now only needs to
optimise its utility locally for a given λ by calculating:
minLi(x,y,λ)
= − ln(Ui − u0i ) +
∑
vj∈Ni
∑
ok∈O
λi,j,k(yi,j,k − xj,k).
We use the standard projected subgradient method [23] to
derive the algorithm. Let h(λ) and ∂d(λ) denote the sub-
gradient and subdifferential of dual function d(·) at point λ
respectively. Then for every hi,j,k ∈ h(λ) we have:
hi,j,k = y
∗
i,j,k − x∗j,k =⇒ h(λ) ∈ ∂d(λ).
Gradient h , h(λ) points to the direction where d(·) increases
fastest. In each iteration, node vi solves the local subsystem
(15) to update the dual variable λ. t represents the tth iteration.
ξt is the step-size in the tth iteration which can be determined
by several standard methods [23]. The projected subgradient
method projects λ on its constraint (i.e. λ  0) in each
iteration, and we use (·)+ as a shorthand for the Euclidean
projection. Eventually λ(t) → λ∗ when t → ∞. The primal
solution can be constructed from the optimum λ∗. Combining
the above, we refer to Eq. (15) as the distributed optimal
algorithm:
x
(t)
i ,y
(t)
i = arg minx,y Li(x,y,λ(t))
h(t) = −(x(t)i − y(t)i )
λ(t+1) = (λ(t) + ξt
∑
vj∈Ni∪{vi} hj)+
(15)
Theorem 2. Optimal algorithm converges to its optimum as
the sequence {λ(1),λ(2) ... λ(t)} converges, if a diminishing
step size is used such that limt→∞ ξt = 0 and
∑∞
t=1 ξt =∞.
The above theorem guarantees convergence [22]. λi,j,k can
be viewed as the “shadow price” of transferring ok from vj to
vi, which is a “cost” for vi but an “income” for vj . Given an
ideal network, the distributed optimal algorithm will converge
faster than the centralised one due to its parallel computations.
It is worth emphasising that although the optimal algorithm
above distributes the calculations over nodes, the overall
computations are not reduced. At the same time, the com-
munication cost increases due to exchanging “shadow price”
information. However, the overall communication complexity
remains the same as that of the centralised solution as we will
later show in Section VI.
V. FAIRCACHE: A LOW-COMPLEXITY HEURISTIC DESIGN
The distributed algorithm, although optimal, comes with
high overheads. To mitigate this, we propose FairCache, a
heuristic algorithm which does not require global knowledge
regarding the content and network topology. We emphasise
that FairCache is a decentralised algorithm for fairly sharing
cache capacity across multiple trusted stakeholders. It is not
intended to be a protocol, by which malicious behaviour
(e.g. falsifying content demand) can be prevented. Hence, we
assume trusted parties who faithfully execute the algorithm,
much like is assumed within existing Internet routing schemes.
A. Overview of Heuristics
To understand the rationality behind our heuristic, we first
give a verbal explanation on the mechanisms of the optimal
algorithm expressed in Eq. (15). Recall λ represents the
shadow price of transmitting an object between two nodes.
Each node hence maintains a list of prices for any given object
from any given node. In each iteration of the optimisation,
6a node tries to minimise its total cost using λ(t). During
the optimisation, the node adjusts its local caching strategy
(via xi and yi) and price list on other nodes (via λ and h).
Namely, a node may decide to cache an object if it brings
significant improvement, or stop retrieving an object from
another node due to high cost. Meanwhile the node adjusts
the price on how to charge its neighbours by offering help.
Then the node collects the price adjustments from all others in
the network and updates its own list. The procedure continues
until the performance converges based on certain well-defined
criteria (as described next). Future updates are periodically
shared to address changes in content popularity. As, generally,
popularity changes are relatively slow to occur (hours, rather
than minutes), this does not create considerable overheads.
The mechanisms above indicate that we can approximate the
optimal algorithm in the following ways:
(i) Cut out unpopular content: This approximation takes
advantage of the highly skewed content popularity distribution.
It is well-known that the popularity distribution has a long and
heavy tail and most content fall into the tail. Removing the tail
can significantly reduce the size of the exchanged messages.
Meanwhile, the results will not be significantly influenced
because of their marginal contribution to the overall utility
(whilst also reducing signalling overheads dramatically). Thus,
requests for unpopular content will be forwarded towards the
origin (as with vanilla NDN [1]).
(ii) Cut out distant nodes: This approximation takes
advantage of topological locality. Since the utility of retrieving
distant content is a decreasing function of the hop count
between two nodes, the value quickly diminishes as path
length increases. It is more likely to find the requested content
in nearby nodes due to content spatial locality [24], [25];
removing remote nodes should not have significant impact on
the result.
(iii) Reverse direction: This approximation takes advan-
tage of the behaviours of gradient methods. In the optimal
algorithm, the neighbourhood (r) gradually shrinks from the
network diameter to its optimum (as a result of minimising
the cost function). However, most elements in yi are already
set to zero by the gradient method in the beginning phase of
the optimisation. Exchanging messages between nodes that are
not going to collaborate is a waste of resources. By growing
the neighbourhood set outwardly, instead of shrinking it, we
can avoid unnecessary message exchange.
B. FairCache Algorithm
We embed the above heuristics in our algorithm, FairCache,
presented in Algorithm 1. It takes several inputs. w is the
local demand matrix. r is for tracking the current number of
hops that defines a node’s neighbourhood radius. θ′ is used
for recording the utility improvement by increasing the radius
from r to r+1, while θ is the threshold below which FairCache
should stop growing the neighbourhood size. λ is the list
for tracking the shadow prices; this needs to be exchanged
amongst nodes (via price adjustment h) in a neighbourhood.
Algorithm 2 shows how heuristic (i) is implemented to derive
a reduced content set.
Algorithm 1 Fair in-network caching (FairCache) on vi
1: Input:
2: Demand matrix w
3: Dual variables λ
4: Search radius r = 0
5: Improvement threshold θ, θ′ (θ = 10−2; θ < θ′)
6: Output:
7: Caching decision xi
8: Collaboration decision yi
9: while θ′ ≥ θ and r < network diameter do
10: r = r + 1; t = 0;
11: while t < tstop do
12: xi, yi = arg minx,y Li(x,y,λ)
13: h = yi − xi; trim h for ∀vj ∈ N+i
14: h = h +
∑
∀vj∈Ni hj
15: λ = (λ + ξh)+
16: t = t+ 1
17: end while
18: Update θ′ with current improvement
19: end while
Algorithm 2 Construct reduced content set O′i on vi
1: Input:
2: Demand matrix w
3: Complete content set O
4: Output:
5: Reduced content set O′i
6: Sort O in decreasing order based on w;
7: set O′i = ∅;
8: for each o ∈ O do
9: if size (O′i) + size (o) ≤ vi’s cache capacity
10: then add o to O′i
11: else break
12: end for each
Algorithm 3 On sending the price update hi on vi
1: Input:
2: Neighbourhood N+i
3: Caching strategy xi, yi
4: set hi = yi − xi;
5: for each vj ∈ N+i do
6: construct h′i from hi based on (O
′
i ∪O′j);
7: send h′i to vj ;
8: end for each
Algorithm 4 On receiving all the h′j on vi
1: Input:
2: Neighbourhood Ni
3: Caching strategy xi, yi
4: set hi = yi − xi;
5: for each vj ∈ Ni do
6: receive h′j from vj ;
7: set hi = hi + h′j ;
8: end for each
7To apply the approximations, for node vi, instead of making
a complete price list, λ, containing all the content and nodes
in the network, node vi makes a partial λ which only includes:
(i) the most popular content that can be fit into its local cache
(i.e. heuristic (i)); and (ii) the nodes in the neighbourhood
defined by r (i.e. heuristic (ii)). It is possible that vi observes
other content in the hj , collected from neighbours while r
grows (i.e. heuristic (iii)), then vi dynamically adds those
content into its own λ. vi can also remove items from λ if they
are too expensive to retrieve. After local optimisation in each
iteration, the price adjustment h will be trimmed before ex-
change by removing information that is not included in λ; and
removing the unchanged items, i.e. the zero values. Essentially,
vi only exchanges the trimmed h within its neighbourhood
and λ only contains the aggregated popular content in the
neighbourhood. Algorithm 3 and 4 detail the logic in lines
13–14 in Algorithm 1 whenever sending and receiving price
updates in each iteration. Obviously, these approximations
render incomplete information (due to removing unpopular
content and distant nodes). To handle the missing λi,j,k in
the local optimisation, we let missing λi,j,k = ∞ (i 6= j),
which indicates that the optimisation algorithm should neither
exchange unpopular content nor exchange content with distant
nodes.
Looking more closely, FairCache consists of two loops.
The outer loop (lines 9–19) increases the search radius r
by one hop in each iteration. The outer loop stops when
the current improvement, θ′, drops below the threshold θ
(i.e. θ′ < θ) due to enlarging the neighbourhood. The inner
loop (lines 11–17) finishes the local optimisation —- this is the
calculation in Eq. (15) for the given neighbourhood defined by
the current radius r. The communication overhead come from
the operation in line 14 which collects the price adjustments hj
from the neighbourhood Ni. Line 15 adjusts the local shadow
price list and updates the λ by removing or adding items.
VI. FAIRCACHE COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
A. Overview
The distributed solution requires exchange of control mes-
sages between nodes, whilst the centralised solution requires
the distribution of the derived solution to all nodes (once it
has been centrally computed). The optimal solution comprises
of |O| matrices of size |V |2. The aggregation of each row i
(in all matrices) represents one specific optimal strategy for
the corresponding node vi in the system. To transmit these
rows to the nodes, the aggregated communication complexity
is Θ(|O| · |V |2). This is the same for the distributed solution,
as this performs the same computation (shared across multiple
nodes). The rest of this section will delineate the complexity of
FairCache. Table II presents an overview of the computational,
communication, and space complexity of all three solutions.
B. FairCache Heuristic Complexity
FairCache’s computation, communication, and space com-
plexities all correlate with the size of the content set and the
neighbourhood set. Herein we evaluate the complexity savings
of FairCache’s three heuristics.
Heuristic (i) is used to reduce the content set size (|O′| from
|O|). The level of reduction depends on both the popularity
distribution of content and the percentage of requests we want
to capture in the request streams. It is well documented that
content popularity follows a Zipf-like distribution [26], [27].
If we assume a Zipf distribution with α = 1.0, for a content
set of 106 equal sized objects, we are able to cover 72.8%
of the requests by caching only 2% of |O|. In other words,
|O′| = 0.02 · |O| indicates a 98% reduction. Even if we only
cache 1000 objects (i.e. 0.1% of |O|), we can still capture 52%
of requests, whilst leading to a significant reduction in |O′|,
i.e. up to 99.9%.
Heuristic (ii) is used to reduce the size of collaboration
neighbourhood, which is |V | for the distributed solution. By
investigating the FairCache algorithm, we can see that the
communication complexity is due to exchanging h in order to
update the local shadow price λ, cf. the last equation in Eq.(15)
and its corresponding line 14 in Algorithm 1. The overhead
therefore consist of two parts. The first part is induced by
replying the queries on h from the nodes having vi in their
neighbourhood, namely N+i . The second part is induced by
collecting h from the nodes in vi’s own neighbourhood,
namely Ni. Given that the communication complexity is mea-
sured by the number of exchanged messages, the complexity
φi of node vi can be calculated as
φi = c · |O′| · (|N+i |+ |Ni|) (16)
Scalar c in Eq. (16) represents a constant factor for commu-
nication complexity, and can be understood as message size
or other protocol-dependent factors. Now we show how to
calculate the overall complexity Φ at system level from φi in
the following.
Given any vj ∈ Ni, a neighbourhood relation can be written
as a tuple (vi, vj). Calculating
∑
vi∈V |Ni| is equivalent to
counting how many tuples there are in the whole system.
Obviously, vi ∈ Nj ⇐⇒ vj ∈ N+i ,∀vi, vj ∈ V , in other
words, as long as there is a tuple (vi, vj) for Ni, there must
be a tuple (vj , vi) for some N+j , and vice versa. Hence we can
show
∑
vi∈V |Ni| =
∑
vi∈V |N+i |. Because one tuple (vi, vj)
represents one message exchange from vi to vj , by using
double counting technique, it is obvious that each message will
be counted twice in the calculation if we try to aggregate all φi:
i.e. (vi, vj) is in both vi’s Ni and vj’s N+j . Therefore, overall
complexity Φ can be calculated as half of the aggregated φi
of all vi in V as below.
Φ =
1
2
∑
vi∈V
φi =
c
2
· |O′| · (
∑
vi∈V
|N+i |+
∑
vi∈V
|Ni|) (17)
= c · |O′| ·
∑
vi∈V
|Ni| (18)
The intuitive explanation of eliminating N+i in calculating
Φ is that we only need to count the aggregated messages sent
out from a node (i.e. the size of a node’s own neighbourhood)
since for each message there is always a correspondence in
the network to receive it. Clearly, if we denote the average
neighbourhood size as |N |, then the system level communi-
8cation complexity of FairCache is Φ = Θ(|O′| · |V | · |N |) as
below.
Φ = c · |O′| ·
∑
vi∈V
|Ni| = c · |O′| ·
∑
vi∈V
|N | (19)
= Θ(|O′| · |V | · |N |) (20)
Similarly in the distributed solution Eq.(15), since each node
has the whole network of size |V | as its neighbourhood and
uses the complete content set O in the optimisation. Then its
complexity can be calculated as Φ = Θ(|O|·|V |2) by plugging
the term |N | = |V | and |O′| = |O| into Eq.(20). As we can
see, the derived complexity is exactly the same as that of the
centralised solution.
Heuristic (iii) is used to minimise the size of the neighbour-
hood by increasing, rather than decreasing, the neighbourhood
size. As we can see from the analysis above, the complexity
of FairCache is proportional to its average neighbourhood size
|N |. Reducing its size is therefore beneficial. The authors in
[24] have proposed a neighbourhood model to calculate |N |
in its closed form on any general network topologies. With its
most general form, the overall complexity of the network of
average r-hop neighbourhood can be calculated as
Φ = |O| · |V | · n1 ·
(
1 +
[
n2
n1
]
+
[
n2
n1
]2
+ · · ·+
[
n2
n1
]r−1 )
= Θ
(
|O| · |V | ·
[
n2
n1
]r )
∀n1, n2 ∈ N, n2 > n1
where n1 and n2 denote the average number of one-hop and
two-hop neighbourhoods, and r represents the search radius. If
we assume n2 > n1 (which holds for all scale-free networks),
the complexity of FairCache will grow exponentially if the
search radius r increases.3 Hence, by ensuring a small r,
Heuristic (iii) dramatically improves scalability. Importantly,
it has been shown that r is very small in most network
optimisation problems [24] (confirmed in Section VII).
Besides the memory for storing the actual content objects,
extra space is needed to store the input parameters of the
optimisation problem (i.e. w and λ). The space complexity
specifically refers to such extra space. Obviously, the space
complexity is also decided by the size of content set and the
size of neighbourhood. Hence FairCache on each node needs
Θ(|O′||N |) memory space to keep track of the information
needed for optimisation. If we assume the average object
size is 800 KB (much smaller than the average YouTube
video size: 8 MB [26]) and each node has 8 GB memory
installed. Each node needs to maintain roughly 104 objects.
If we allocate 64-bit space to store the information for each
object, given a neighbourhood of 10 nodes, even in the worst
case wherein all these content sets are disjoint, each node
only needs approximately 800 KB extra memory. However,
spatial locality is very common [24] in content networks,
which means there is a significant overlap regarding the stored
content among nearby routers. If we assume that only 10% of
objects are overlapping, the 800 KB can be further reduced to
651 KB (by summing up a geometric sequence to calculate). In
3Note that most natural graphs like Internet, ISP networks, and social
networks are all scale-free [28]
Complexity comparison of three different solutions
Type of complexity Centralised Distributed FairCache
Computation Θ(|O||V |2) Θ(|O||V |2) Θ(|O′||V ||N |)
Communication Θ(|O||V |2) Θ(|O||V |2) Θ(|O′||V ||N |)
Memory space Θ(|O||V |2) Θ(|O||V |2) Θ(|O′||V ||N |)
Individual (worst) Θ(|O||V |2) Θ(|O||V |) Θ(|O′||N |)
TABLE II: The overall and (worst) individual complexity of
the three solutions. The communication complexity of the
centralised solution does not occur during the computation but
comes afterwards when distributing the solution to all nodes.
The distributed solution does not reduce any complexity of
the centralised solution but, instead, shares it across multiple
nodes. FairCache significantly reduces all three complexities
by applying its heuristics.
the end, the extra memory overhead (i.e. the ratio between the
memory space for parameters and memory space for objects)
is less than 0.01%.
C. Complexity Summary
Table II summarises our previous analysis of the complexity
of the three different solutions. We wish to highlight the
following key points:
• The computation and space complexity of the centralised
and distributed solutions are identical. It is always Φ =
Θ(|O| · |V |2). However, because the distributed solution
is able to share the complexity across each node in the
network, in practice, it leads to a more scalable design
and avoids the single point of failure.
• FairCache is able to reduce all complexities by limit-
ing the sizes of the content set and its collaborative
neighbourhood. The complexity of FairCache is only a
small fraction of the distributed solution, more precisely
|O′|
|O| · |N ||V | . We have shown |O|  |O′|, also in reality
|V |  |N | (as showed in [24]). We also confirm this
experimentally in Section VII), hence the improvement is
significant and improvements should grow as the network
size increases.
• FairCache on each node needs Θ(|O′||N |) memory space
to keep track of the information needed for optimisation
(i.e. w and λ). In practice this introduces only negligi-
ble overhead. As the average object size is bigger, the
overhead becomes even smaller.
VII. FAIRCACHE EVALUATION
A. Methodology
To evaluate FairCache, we perform extensive simulations
using the publicly available LiteLab platform [29]. We use
several topologies. First, we use real topologies collected
by the Rocketfuel project [28]; namely, two ISP router-level
topologies: Sprint (604 nodes, 2,279 edges) and AT&T (631
nodes, 2,078 edges). This embodies the usecase where an
individual network has allowed the deployment of caches in
their network by multiple parties (e.g. via network function
virtualisation). Second, we use traces from Guifi [12]. Guifi
is the largest open wireless community mesh network in the
9world. It allows any user to purchase equipment and become
part of the network. We use its core network topology in the
Catalunya region (735 nodes, 1,059 edges). Third, we use
the CAIDA ITDK trace [30] which takes a snapshots of the
Internet AS topology every 24 hours. We use the 7/01/2017
trace (25,107 nodes, 49,458 edges). This captures the situation
where each AS operates its own caches, but chooses to col-
laborate with neighbouring ASes. Fourth, to allow us to vary
key graph parameters, we also generate synthetic networks
based on two models: the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model and
the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) model. Four parameter sets are used for
these synthetic networks: {BA1 : m = 2}, {BA2 : m = 4},
{ER1 : p = 1.1 · log(n)/n} and {ER2 : p = 1.5 · log(n)/n}.
If there are multiple components in a synthetic network, we
only use the largest one. log(n)/n in the setting guarantees
there is only one single giant component in the network with
high probability [31]. We have also analysed many recent AS-
level topologies using the CAIDA ITDK traces [30]. Since
most AS networks have an average degree of 4, we use BA2
configuration to reflect this fact. Therefore, we note that our
synthetic networks represent both a per-router and per-AS
topologies. For each topology we attach a single client to each
edge router (i.e. with degree of 1). For example, this results in
161 clients in Sprint; 207 clients in AT&T; and 200 in Guifi.
We then randomly select between 10 and 20 distinct routers to
attach a source to. Each router is then allocated a given cache
capacity, which we vary; the default is 4 GB, which is < 0.1%
of the corpus. We select a low value to be representative of
feasible cache capacity in a wide area network with a large
corpus.
Using the above topologies, clients generate requests at each
simulation tick, which are then routed through the network to
either a content source or an intermediate cache based on the
strategy employed. We base our content set on the Youtube
trace from [26]. This contains 1,687,506 objects (average size
is 8.0 MB and aggregated size is 12.87 TB). We use the view
count information to fit a Zipf (α) distribution (α = 0.9537) to
model the overall content popularity. To explore the impact of
different request patterns, we also perform sensitivity analysis
on α. Throughout this section, we use our distributed optimal
algorithm (i.e. Eq. (15)) as an optimal benchmark to compare
FairCache against. Each result is averaged over 50 runs;
errorbars are not plotted if they are sufficiently small (< 5%).
B. Scalability
We start by exploring scalability, measured by FairCache’s
convergence rate, i.e. how many rounds of message exchange
it takes the algorithm to bootstrap. This happens once at
initiation: future dynamics are addressed using periodic low
cost updates that are algorithmically trivial. Figure 2a com-
pares the convergence rates of the optimal (the upper figure)
and FairCache (the lower figure) on the various topologies.
The optimal needs significantly longer time to bootstrap than
FairCache. Unsurprisingly, larger cache sizes also lead to a
longer convergence time, as more state must be exchanged.
To investigate how network size impacts the convergence rate,
we use synthetic topologies with 4 GB caches. The lines in
Figure 2b are clearly divided into two groups: the upper one is
the optimal (with hollow markers) and the lower one is Fair-
Cache (with filled markers). The convergence rate degrades
as the network size grows. Importantly, though, the increase
in convergence time only grows sub-linearly, stabilising at
networks of size 1k; we experimented with topologies of up
to 9k nodes to find consistent results.
We also measure FairCache’s scalability by its traffic over-
heads. Clearly, it is undesirable to generate large amounts of
control messages to bootstrap. In this experiment, we measure
the aggregated size of control messages for both the distributed
optimal and FairCache as CO and CF respectively. We then
calculate the traffic reduction as CO−CFCO . Figure 2c presents a
box plot of the results for both BA1 (upper boxes) and ER1
(lower boxes) topologies. It shows that FairCache is able to
achieve over 80% traffic reductions, even on small networks of
100 nodes. As the network size increases, the benefit of using
FairCache becomes more obvious. In a network of 900 nodes,
FairCache attains 95% reductions. This equates to significant
traffic volumes; in one iteration, a 500 node network with
103 objects can save 887 MB of control traffic via FairCache
(leaving only 66.8 MB). With FairCache, on average, each
cache only introduces 136 KB traffic overhead in an iteration.
We can therefore combine the above message overhead and
convergence measurements to calculate the convergence time.
If we configure the rate of control messages to 100 KB/s,
FairCache takes 11 minutes to bootstrap. This is just 4.6% of
the time taken by the distributed optimal algorithm. Given a
saturated 54 Mbit link, the FairCache control messages would
therefore consume just 1.4% of bandwidth. Importantly, this
is only a bootstrap process; changes in request patterns are
addressed with low cost updates within each node’s neigh-
bourhood. Even in highly dynamic situations where demands
are volatile, we can let nodes exchange demand information
in the background while running FairCache. Once the new
demand matrix is constructed, FairCache simply re-calculates
the new solution. Recall our setting in Section VI where
each node needs to maintain 651 KB demand information. To
guarantee FairCache continuously runs, a total of 651×10 KB
needs to be exchanged among 10 nodes within 11 minutes,
these updates constitute under 10 KB/s. These values can be
configured to reflect the operating environment (we anticipate
that in many cases operators would transfer state at much
higher rates). Overall, we believe these overheads are more
than acceptable for the overall performance gains (§VII-E)
C. Accuracy
FairCache significantly reduces the convergence time and
messaging overhead of fairly allocating caching responsibili-
ties. These improvements potentially come at the cost of accu-
racy (i.e. lower utility than optimal solution). We next inspect
the accuracy sacrifice required to obtain these improvements.
To measure the accuracy of FairCache, we compare it
against the optimal algorithm using multiple topologies of
different sizes. We first run the optimal algorithm and measure
the utility Ui for every node i. Similarly, we run FairCache
and measure the utility U ′i . We then calculate the accuracy of
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Fig. 2: Compared to the optimal algorithm, FairCache is more scalable on both real and synthetic networks. FairCache has a
faster convergence rate and generates less traffic overhead than the optimal. Meanwhile FairCache achieves high accuracy.
FairCache as its ratio to the optimal for every node, i.e. U
′
i
Ui
.
Figure 2d plots the per node CDF of this ratio. We can see
that FairCache achieves very high accuracy. For large networks
like Guifi, all the nodes achieve an accuracy of over 92%.
For medium size networks like Sprint, all the nodes have at
least 97% accuracy and about 50% of the nodes reach 100%
accuracy. Besides Figure 2d, we also measure the aggregated
accuracy using
∑
i U
′
i∑
i Ui
. We find it is always above 95% for
medium-sized networks, whilst it decreases slightly for larger
networks (i.e. 3% drop from Sprint to Guifi). Even for the
very large CAIDA topology (over 25k nodes), the average
accuracy is still ≈ 95% with fewer than 6% nodes that have
an accuracy drop of 10% ∼ 20%. These findings are consistent
across the other topologies. To validate that these benefits
continue to be enjoyed by large topologies, we also repeated
the experiments presented in Figure 2b on topologies ranging
from 1k–9k nodes. Again, we find high levels of accuracy,
stabilising at 95%.
The results confirm the rationale behind the heuristics used
by FairCache. The approximation introduces almost negligible
degradation in the accuracy. The main reason is that the highly
skewed content popularity means that the bulk of caching de-
cisions are limited to the most popular objects. This means that
FairCache can attain high accuracy without requiring to share
information about all objects (unlike the optimal). Further,
by localising interactions to neighbouring nodes, FairCache
can scale-up easily, without be overly affected by increasing
network sizes.
D. Price of Fairness
FairCache aims to realise fair collaboration amongst nodes,
which could cause a degradation in aggregated global utility.
We use the Price of Fairness (PoF) to measure the loss
in utility. The PoF is calculated as the ratio between the
aggregated utility loss of all nodes using FairCache and the
global optimal that does not consider fairness [16]. A higher
PoF value indicates a larger utility sacrifice.
Figure 3a and 3b plot the PoF results of using both real and
synthetic networks with three cache sizes. Both figures convey
the same information, which is that the PoF increases as
network size increases. We experiment with both realistic and
synthetic networks of up to 9k nodes (Table III summarises the
Scalability test on PoF and accuracy using real ISP topologies.
ASN #nodes #edges Accuracy PoF (2GB) PoF (4GB)
#1755 295 544 97.3% 16.5% 11.3%
#3356 1620 6743 96.2% 20.8% 13.7%
#1221 2669 3181 95.4% 22.6% 14.9%
#2914 4670 7618 94.8% 23.9% 15.4%
#1239 7337 9924 94.7% 24.3% 15.6%
#7018 9430 11682 94.8% 24.1% 15.2%
Caida 25107 49458 94.6% 24.4% 15.4%
TABLE III: Key metrics for increasing network sizes (295
- 25k nodes). Networks are real ISP topologies taken from
Rocketfuel and CAIDA AS-level trace.
results), to find that the PoF stabilises after reaching a size of
≈3k nodes with a maximum PoF of 24% (and a maximum of
20% in the real topologies, e.g. Guifi). This is not negligible,
but is likely not significant enough to dissuade caches that are
interested in fairness from using FairCache. Interestingly, our
results also show that increasing the cache size is an effective
way to ameliorate the loss in efficiency. In Figure 3a, a 4 GB
cache significantly improves the PoF. Using a 2 GB cache,
the PoF increases by 11% when the network size increases
from 100 to 900, whereas the PoF only increases by 3% if a
4 GB cache is used. Figure 3b shows similar properties with,
for example, a 57% improvement in PoF when increasing the
cache size from 2 GB cache to 4 GB in Guifi.
Overall, we believe that an average PoF of < 8% is a
cost worth paying for those concerned by a need for fairness.
Moreover, FairCache exhibits good scalability regarding both
accuracy and PoF, as the results in Table III show. The accu-
racy only slightly degrades (1.5%) from 1000 nodes to 9000
nodes, and is always above 94.7%. The accuracy stabilises af-
ter 2000 nodes. Similarly, PoF stabilises after reaching around
3000 nodes. For the 2GB cache configuration, PoF is capped
by 24.3%; 4GB by 15.6%; 8GB by 11.4% (not included in
Table III due to space limit). The scalability of FairCache can
be explained as follows: only small neighbourhoods play an
important role in deciding a node’s overall performance. As
the size of the neighbourhood is relatively unaffected by the
network size, this property always exists.
E. Caching Performance
The previous section has shown that utility is reduced by
considering fairness. Next, we explore performance from the
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Fig. 3: FairCache achieves fairness by trading off some efficiency. However, a large cache size can effectively reduce PoF. In
reality, FairCache is able to achieve very similar performance as Global, and is superior to Greedy in all cases.
perspective of traditional metrics: byte hit rate and footprint
reduction. Hit rate is a conventional metric to measure sav-
ing on inter-domain traffic, whilst footprint reduction is the
reduction on the product of traffic volume and distance.
We compare FairCache against two other strategies:
(i) Greedy, which computes the local optimal for each cache
without collaboration; and (ii) Global, which maximises the
aggregated utility. Figure 3c and 3d plot the results on the
real networks using 4 GB caches. Naturally, Figure 3c shows
that Global achieves the best hit rates due the fact that it opti-
mises the overall network. That said, FairCache only performs
slightly worse, with a 5%–10% performance degradation.
Compared to Greedy, FairCache is consistently superior with
at least a 28% improvement. This shows that, regardless of
fairness, FairCache can offer significant performance improve-
ments over local algorithms (note that Greedy is the theoretical
upper bound of algorithms such as Least Recently Used).
When inspecting the traffic footprint reduction, performance
is even higher. FairCache is superior in all networks. Although
the reasons are intuitive for Greedy, which sees nodes locally
optimising, it is more surprising in Global. The reason is that
FairCache only requests from nearby caches (limited by r). In
contrast, Global uses any node in the network. This increases
hit rates, but results in more traffic.
To have a closer look how utility is spread across caches,
we select the AT&T network and study the utility distribution
in the network (i.e. how are traffic savings distributed across
caches). Figure 4a plots the CDF of normalised utility values
across each node (normalised by the top value per simulation).
By comparing Greedy and FairCache, we see that every node
is better off through collaboration using FairCache (note this is
also the case across all other topologies and cache sizes). On
the other hand, the Global strategy intersects with both Greedy
and FairCache, i.e. some caches in Global get lower utility than
Greedy. The area between the lines indicates the percentage
of caches that are worse off due to global optimisation.
The Global strategy leads to 13% of nodes getting worse
off compared to Greedy, and 20% compared to FairCache.
With Global, these nodes should rationally cease to cooperate.
Again, regarding the aggregated utility, Global is only about
5% better than FairCache. Moreover, the CDF curve of Global
is more stretched than that of FairCache, which indicates there
are much larger variations in nodes’ utilities when using the
Global strategy, i.e. benefits are not evenly distributed.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of strategies on AT&T, 4 GB cache size.
Figure 4b shows the log-log plot of nodes’ normalised
utility as a function of betweenness centrality [7], [14]. Nodes
with a high betweenness are core routers, whilst those with
low betweenness are usually found at the edge. Interestingly,
when nodes use the Global strategy, a node’s utility strongly
correlates with its position in the network: core nodes gain
the highest utility. This is because the Global optimal tends
to place all the popular (i.e. high value) content at the core
to reduce duplicates — a theoretically attractive, but practi-
cally infeasible approach. In contrast, FairCache significantly
weakens this correlation. This is beneficial as it means that
utility is also increased at the edge caches. As well as
improving fairness, it also reduces load in the backbone and
provides consumers with lower delay access to object. This
also contributes to FairCache’s high traffic reductions, as hits
are pushed closer to clients.
F. Sensitivity Analysis of Spatial/Content Locality
FairCache’s heuristics take advantage of highly skewed
spatial and content popularity localities. A natural question
is how these localities impact the algorithm. To explore this,
we perform sensitivity analysis across these two parameters
to measure the robustness of our heuristics. Here, we solely
present the Guifi topology due to space constraints. The
reason we select Guifi is that the dataset contains geographic
coordinates of each node, allowing much more fine grained
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Fig. 5: Experiments on the Guifi network, 4 GB cache size. We vary both content popularity skewness α and spatial locality
factor β from 0.1 to 1. We observe a gradual and slow improvement in caching performance as spatial locality factor increases.
Both spatial locality and content popularity skewness have significant impacts on the accuracy and the traffic reduction.
analysis of spatial locality. We have confirmed that the results
are representative of the other topologies.
We use a Hawkes process-based algorithm [24], [25] to
generate a user request trace. The algorithm is controlled by
two parameters: a content popularity skewness α and a spatial
locality factor β. α controls the overall content popularity
which follows Zipf (α). The spatial locality factor, β = 0,
means the request pattern reduces to an Independent Reference
Model; whilst β = 1 indicates very high spatial localisation
(i.e. requests for an object often occur in the same locale).
First, we inspect their impact on the caching performance
metrics. Figure 5 presents the results by varying both α and
β in (0, 1]. From Figure 5a and 5b, we observe a shallow
improvement on byte hit rate and footprint reduction as β
increases. Specifically, they increase by only 6% and 8%
respectively when increasing β from 0.1 to 1. This suggests
that spatial locality is not a critical requirement for FairCache.
On the other hand, the popularity skew, α, has a more
significant impact on the accuracy and message reduction
of FairCache. Figure 5c shows that the average accuracy of
FairCache improves from 85% to 97% by increasing α from
0.2 to 1. The speed of degradation of accuracy by decreasing
α also slows down at certain point (α = 0.4). The reason
is because the general popularity distribution gets closer to
a uniform distribution (due to a small α). Thus, items are
randomly requested, which means that each object has a
similar utility when being cached. Interestingly, this means
the overall utility of a cache will not vary much, though the
solution can be quite different from the optimal one.
Last, we inspect the messaging overhead of running Fair-
Cache, presented as the reduction in comparison to the dis-
tributed optimal solution again. In Figure 5d, we see that
both α and β have a notable impact. Higher α and β both
result in lower overheads (i.e. higher reductions). The reason
is that a smaller α value leads to a more uniform popularity
distribution, which makes the demand matrices deviate more
from each other, which further leads to larger exchanged
messages for λ values. The smaller β values have almost the
same effect on demand matrices as that of α. However, we also
notice that β has more significant impacts when α is small.
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Fig. 6: The distribution of neighbourhood size (in terms of
r) after FairCache converges. (a) uses seven ISP topologies;
there is a relatively strong negative correlation between nodes’
average degree and their average neighbourhood size. (b) uses
Guifi topology with three cache configurations; the numbers
in the grid show the percentage of the nodes and percentage
of the control messages (in red).
As previously stated in § VI, maintaining some neighbour-
hoods is critical for ensuring scalability. This is because (i) it
dictates the communication overhead; and (ii) it justifies the
effectiveness of the heuristic (iii). In this section, we present
our empirical study on the neighbourhood size. We launch a
number of experiments using the default setup, whilst varying
the topology (as this is what dictates the neighbourhood
size). We measure the neighbourhood sizes after FairCache
converges (represented by the search radius r).
Figure 6a plots the average search radius, r, as a function
of the average degree of the topology. We use seven r1-level
ISP topologies (i.e. ISP router-level topology with one-hop
clients included), with a 2GB cache size. As the average degree
increases, r decreases, thereby reducing network overhead.
This is because network density increases, it becomes less
necessary to create multi-hop neighbourhoods. Most important
is the fact that even with a low degree, the search radius is
very small on all topologies (around 2 hops).
Figure 6b presents results for experiments performed on
the Guifi network. It shows a heatmap, which reveals the
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percentage of nodes that have a certain radius (across three
cache sizes). Each point in the grid shows the percentage of
nodes in a simulation that have a certain search radius (lighter
colour means more), as well as the percentage of control
messages generated within each neighbourhood (shown in
red). Figure 6b conveys two pieces of important information.
First, most of the nodes end up with a neighbourhood of fewer
than 3 hops. Even for the small 2GB cache sizes, 87% of
the nodes have no more than 2-hop search radius. Second,
using larger cache size makes the distribution even more
skewed, which further leads to even smaller search radius.
When we increase the cache size from 2GB to 8GB, the
percentage of nodes with a 1-hop radius increases from 45% to
86%. With 8 GB cache, 97% of nodes’ final neighbourhoods
are no more than 2 hops. In addition, we also provide the
distribution of control messages in each r-hop neighbourhood,
plotted in red colour in the same grid. As we can see, the
traffic distribution is even more condensed within a very small
neighbourhood, which indicates most interactions are between
directly connected neighbours. We have confirmed that these
results are mirrored across all other topologies.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Deployment of FairCache raises a number of interesting
questions. A key practical concern is the potential for parties
to participate in FairCache in a malicious or non-cooperative
manner. This is a possibility as nodes are expected to report
shadow prices, which they could be manipulated. FairCache is
not intended to force stakeholders to collaborate, or to protect
against cheating; hence, we have assumed that all nodes
adhere to the FairCache algorithm. However, if deployed, such
complexities would need to be addressed. In current inter-
domain network protocols this problem is handled using out-
of-band trust establishment, alongside signing authorities to
bind autonomous systems to trusted identities (e.g. RPKI
[32]). Equally, we envisage FairCache could rely on similar
principles, in which legally formed (potentially transitive)
collaboration agreements are underpinned by public key cryp-
tography.
There are also a number of alternative practical concerns.
We implicitly assumed that the demand matrix is stationary,
whereas in reality the demand will change over time. Recall
that the space complexity (in Section VI) of storing an
individual demand matrix in FairCache is Θ(|O′||N |), hence
the complexity of updating the whole matrix is bounded
by Θ(|O′||N |). Two other facts further help to reduce this
overhead: (i) the spatial locality we have mentioned; and
(ii) the various research [26] that has reported that such
changes are gradual. Hence we can incrementally update the
demand matrix to avoid unnecessary traffic. Furthermore, such
occasional and incremental updates do not necessarily need
to be synchronised especially when FairCache is deployed
as an ever-running background process. In theory, the stale
information may slow down the convergence in an iterative op-
timisation process. In practice, less-frequent and incremental
updates can ameliorate such impacts [23]. Moreover, due to the
nature of FairCache algorithm, the updates mostly affect the
local neighbourhood and their cascading effects will drastically
decrease out of the neighbourhood.
Although we have focussed on building an efficient al-
gorithm, we also acknowledge that FairCache treats storage
as the key bottleneck. There are also a number of other
constraints that could be included [33]. For instance, hard-
ware bottlenecks can render servers useless even whilst in
possession of content (e.g. CPU, I/O bus, congestion collapse).
Thus, deployment would probably involve the introduction of
such considerations into our model of fairness and utility. This
could, for example, result in caches actively storing the same
object in an attempt to share heavy load. Another simplifying
assumption is the modelling of delay using hop count (like
BGP); whereas this is a useful abstraction, it does not consider
the variability introduced by realtime congestion. We consider
this an acceptable sacrifice, as introducing such realtime con-
siderations would introduce burdensome overheads. Another
point worth highlighting is that we base caching decisions
on per-object popularity counts, therefore introducing greater
memory overheads than algorithms like Least Recently Used.
We emphasise, however, that our heuristic removes all unpop-
ular content, making such counts highly feasible.
IX. RELATED WORK
There are three key related areas of work: collaborative
caching, content delivery networks (CDNs) and game theo-
retical studies of caching. Collaborative in-network caching
has been proven as an effective methodology to improve
system performance in various contexts [4]–[8], [10], [13],
[34], even though edge caching has also been shown to be
effective [35]. Previously proposed solutions are either limited
by a centralised solver [6], [36] which makes scalability
difficult, or limited by distributed heuristics [4], [5], [7], [8],
[10], [13], [34], which neither guarantees a global optimum
nor Pareto efficiency. FairCache is most related to the latter in
that we do not guarantee a global optimum; however, we build
on their contributions by introducing the concept of fairness
and ensuring Pareto efficiency. Importantly, we also reveal the
need for fairness to encourage engagement by cache operators.
Recently, fair cache sharing also attracts enough attention
in cloud computing and system research, e.g. [37] proposes
FairRide using blocking to achieve isolation-guarantee and
strategy-proofness properties.
The current solution used for Internet-scale content delivery
are CDNs. They hold many similarities to ICNs [35], however,
unlike our proposal, they are not collaborative entities. Typ-
ically, they are operated by distinct companies that deploy
independent infrastructures. Some, like Akamai, sell their
capacity to third party content providers (arguably a form of
collaboration), whilst others build dedicated infrastructures for
their own content (e.g. Google, Facebook, Netflix). Recent
work within the IETF has endeavoured to support inter-
CDN cache sharing [38], however, this only provides protocol
support, rather than algorithms to decide when, where and how
caches should be shared. Hence, our work is orthogonal, and
could be applied to CDNs as a recent proposal in [39].
Game theory is an effective tool to analyse the effects of
individual behaviours in a complex system; e.g. prior work
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[40] analyses the fairness achieved in bandwidth allocation
by coordinated and uncoordinated rate control over multiple
links in peer-to-peer networks. Recent work [3], [36], [41]–
[44] applies game theory to study in-network caching. In these
papers, the caching problem is modelled as non-cooperative,
pure strategic games and the equilibrium is analysed. Unlike
us, these work take a system-level utilitarian approach that
aims to achieve a global optimum. In contrast, we focus on
attaining fairness amongst nodes. More related to us is [3],
[36], [42], which look at how selfishness drives nodes to act.
These studies show how selfishness impact the equilibrium
and efficiency in cache systems (measured by the Price of
Anarchy). They also show that the global optimum is seldom
achieved due to lack of coordination and nodes’ inherent
selfishness. Again, fairness is overlooked though; we introduce
this as an integral requirement of cooperation.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work in ICN has
tried to solve the collaborative caching as a bargaining game
and has devised a low-complexity heuristic to embrace both
efficiency and fairness.
X. CONCLUSION
To date, studies of collaborative ICN caching have focussed
on traditional metrics such as hit rate, assuming that nodes
are happy to contribute to achieving a global optimum. In this
paper, we have argued that practical situations are unlikely
to adhere to this model. Instead, caches operated by separate
stakeholders will expect a reasonable level of fairness, where
they are not penalised for cooperating with others. We began
by delineating an optimal solution, which ensures no node
attains lower utility by collaborating. To address its high
complexity, we have also proposed a heuristic algorithm,
FairCache, which we have shown achieves high performance
at a fraction of the cost. Unlike past work, FairCache offers
Pareto efficiency and proportional fairness, ensuring that all
nodes are incentivised to collaborate. As well as helping
to promote cooperation, our results show that proportional
fairness plays a key role in balancing network traffic too.
It helps maintain more hits at the edge, rather than globally
optimal solutions that centralise hits in the core. We are not
prescriptive in how FairCache is deployed and have ensured
that it can be used either globally or amongst a subset of
collaborating nodes. Hence, our key take-home message is that
future collaborative caching designs should cease to assume
purely altruistic cooperation and, instead, be explicitly built
around the concept of fairness.
There are several lines of potential future work. First, we
plan to build a wireline protocol to implement FairCache’s
design. The most prominent challenge in this regard is imple-
menting a FairCache protocol that is robust against cheating
nodes. This is a fascinating area of future work; currently, we
assume trusted certified parties that do not lie, however, we
wish to expand this to cover more dynamic arrangements in
which trust can be formed on-the-fly. Note that this would not
necessarily involve significant changes to FairCache — simply
augmentary functions, e.g. key exchange. Clearly, this should
be underpinned by a hardware implementation for exploring
practical feasibility at line rates. There are various other real-
world concerns that could also be integrated into FairCache
too. For instance, dynamics regarding link availability, conges-
tion and request patterns could be explored. This should extend
to integrating new constraints (e.g. bandwidth, power, CPU),
as well as alternate forms of fairness (e.g. bandwidth fairness,
user-centric fairness). Lastly, we wish to expand FairCache to
consider situations in which caches have external influences
(e.g. business arrangements) that modify their behaviours. As
of yet, little work has considered exogenous incentives that
drive caching collaboration. We therefore see this as a fruitful
line of study.
APPENDIX
Let T : Rn → Rn be the sorting operator used in [16]. More
precisely, that is, we say U is lexicographically larger than or
equal to U′ if we can write U lex U′ ⇐⇒ Ui ≥ U ′i ,∀i ∈
[0, n) after applying T to both U and U′. lex can be similarly
defined. If we let U∗ be the corresponding utilities achieved
by using (x∗,y∗) which fulfils a certain well-defined fairness.
Let Uwi denote the minimum utility of vi of a given solution.
Technically, we have the following definitions of the two
fairness metrics besides the previously defined Proportional
Fairness (PF).
Definition 6. Egalitarian Fairness (EF): (x∗,y∗) is EF iff
∀(x,y) 6= (x∗,y∗)⇒ the following two conditions cannot be
both true at the same time. (1) ∃i, s.t. Ui ≥ U∗i ; (2) ∀i, j s.t.
Ui − Uwi = Uj − Uwj .
Definition 7. Max-Min Fairness (MF): (x∗,y∗) is MF iff
∀(x,y) 6= (x∗,y∗)⇒ T (U∗) lex T (U).
These definitions are followed by the theorems below, both
of which have rather straightforward proofs as we will show
in the following.
Theorem 3. In a fair collaborative game (Ω, u0), the optimal
caching strategy (x∗,y∗) achieves PF.
Theorem 4. In a fair collaborative game (Ω, u0) with optimal
strategy (x∗,y∗), EF is sufficient for MF, i.e. EF ⇒ MF.
In our caching games, PF is naturally guaranteed by NBS
as Theorem 3 states. It is also intuitively easy to understand
that if a Pareto efficient solution exists and achieves EF, it
also achieves MF at the same time, as Theorem 4 states.
A. Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. Because (x∗,y∗) is the optimal caching solution,
namely (x∗,y∗) = arg maxx,y
∑
vi∈V ln(Ui − u0i ). Let
f(U) =
∑
vi∈V ln(Ui−u0i ). For f(U) to reach its maximum,
the necessary and sufficient first order condition is ∇f∗ = 0.
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∀(x,y) 6= (x∗,y∗)⇒ ∃λ  0 such that λ−1i = Ui − u0i > 0.
Then ∀vi ∈ V we have
∇f∗ − λ ≺ 0 =⇒ ∂f
∗
∂U∗i
− λi < 0
=⇒ 1
U∗i − u0i
− λi < 0
=⇒ λ
−1
i
U∗i − u0i
− U
∗
i − u0i
U∗i − u0i
< 0
Sum over all the vi ∈ V , we have∑
vi∈V
(Ui − u0i )− (U∗i − u0i )
U∗i − u0i
< 0 =⇒
∑
vi∈V
Ui − U∗i
U∗i − u0i
< 0
By definition 5, strategy (x∗,y∗) is proportionally fair.
B. Proof of Theorem 4.
Proof. Instead of directly proving that ”EF is sufficient for
MF in a fair collaborative game (Ω, u0)”, we first prove that
”EF is sufficient for KS fairness”. Recall that KS optimises
the players of the worst utility, hence KS fairness refers to the
strategy that maximises the minimum utility in a game.
We prove the theorem by contradiction. Let’s assume so-
lution (x∗,y∗) is egalitarian fair, but not KS fair. U∗ is the
corresponding utility value.
Let’s further assume another solution (x′,y′) 6= (x∗,y∗)
which achieves KS fairness, and U′ is its utility value. In a
fair collaborative game, based on the nature of Nash bargaining
framework, both (x′,y′) and (x∗,y∗) are Pareto optimal.
By definition, KS fair solution indicates that
min{U ′i − Uwi , ...} > min{U∗i − Uwi , ...}, ∀vi ∈ V (21)
By definition, egalitarian fair solution indicates that
min{U∗i − Uwi , ...} = U∗i − Uwi = U∗j − Uwj ,∀vi, vj ∈ V
(22)
(21), (22) =⇒
U ′i − Uwi ≥ U∗i − Uwi , ∀vi ∈ V (23)
U ′i − Uwi > U∗i − Uwi , ∃vi ∈ V (24)
Inequality (24) contradicts with the fact that (x∗,y∗) is Pareto
optimal. So the assumption does not hold. (x∗,y∗) must be
both egalitarian fair and KS fair.
Because (x∗,y∗) is already a Pareto optimal solution, both
MF and KS are the same. Therefore, in a fair collaborative
game (Ω, u0), EF is sufficient for MF. I.e., EF ⇒MF .
C. Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. The proof is trivial. Since Ui in eq. (3) is affine and
positive, the non-negative weighted sum of Ui is still affine
and positive. All the affine functions are log-concave. So the
objective function (4) is concave.
In addition, all (5)(6)(7)(8) and (9) are defined over a set
of compact and convex constraints. Therefore, problem (4) is
a convex optimisation problem.
D. Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. Obviously caching decision space [0, 1] ⊂ R+ is
a nonempty, compact and convex set. Since the objective
function (4) is a continuously differentiable concave function,
and all the constraints on the variables are affine, Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and sufficient
for the existence of an optimal solution.
To derive the optimum of a function with constraints, we
first derive the Lagrangian L(·) of eq. (4). Let α  0, β  0,
γ  0, δ  0 and λ  0 be the KKT multipliers associated
with constraints. Their subscripts are self-explained by the
corresponding constraints associated with. Then we have
L(x,λ,α,β,γ, δ) =∑
vi∈V
ln(Ui − u0i )−
∑
vi∈V
∑
vj∈Ni
∑
ok∈O
λi,j,k(yi,j,k − xj,k)
−
∑
vi∈V
αi(
∑
ok∈O
xi,k − Ci)−
∑
vi∈V
∑
ok∈O
βi,k(
∑
vj∈Ni
yi,j,k − 1)
−
∑
vi∈V
∑
ok∈O
γi,k(xi,k − 1) +
∑
vi∈V
∑
vj∈Ni
∑
ok∈O
δi,j,kyi,j,k
Note we dropped constraints xi,j ≥ 0 and yi,j,k ≤ 1 in making
the Lagrangian because constraints (6) and (7) make them
redundant. In the following derivation, we let τi,k = Ui−u0i −
wi,kxi,k and τ ′i,k = Ui − u0i − wi,kli,j yi,j,k for the simplicity of
representation. For the objective function to reach its optimum,
first order necessary and sufficient conditions are
∇L(x,λ,α,β,γ, δ) = 0
⇐⇒ ∂L
∂xi,k
= 0,∀vi, vj ∈ V,∀ok ∈ O
⇐⇒ wi,k
Ui − u0i
+
∑
vj∈N+i
λj,i,k − αi − γi,k = 0
⇐⇒ x∗i,k =
1
αi + γi,k −
∑
vj∈N+i λj,i,k
− τi,k
wi,k
with complementary slackness
λi,j,k(yi,j,k − xj,k) = 0, ∀vi, vj ∈ V,∀ok ∈ O
αi(
∑
ok∈O xi,k − Ci) = 0, ∀vi ∈ V,∀ok ∈ O
βi,k(
∑
vj∈Ni yi,j,k − 1) = 0, ∀vi ∈ V,∀ok ∈ O
γi,k(xi,k − 1) = 0, ∀vi ∈ V,∀ok ∈ O
δi,j,kyi,j,k = 0, ∀vi, vj ∈ V,∀ok ∈ O
(25)
Similarly, we can derive the optimal y∗i,j,k as x
∗
i,k. The op-
timal caching strategy (x∗,y∗) of the network can be derived
by solving the equation system (25) for all the nodes.
E. Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. To prove convergence, we first prove the gradient of the
dual function is bounded by a constant K, namely the dual
function d(λ) is K-Lipschitz continuous. Second, we show
that given the diminishing step size, the Euclidean distance
between the optimum d(λ∗) and the best value d(λ◦) achieved
in all previous iterations converges to zero in limit.
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Since the primal (2) is strictly convex and all constraints
are linear, dual d(λ) is strictly concave and differentiable.
∂d(λ)
∂λi,j,k
= yi,j,k − xi,k =⇒
∣∣∣∣ ∂d(λ)∂λi,j,k
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 (26)
By Mean value theorem, there exists c ∈ (λ,λ′) such that
d(λ)− d(λ′) = ∇d(c)T (λ− λ′) (27)
By Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, let n = |O| × |V |2, we have
‖d(λ)− d(λ′)‖2 = ‖∇d(c)T (λ− λ′)‖2 (28)
≤ ‖∇d(c)‖2‖λ− λ′‖2 (29)
≤ √n‖λ− λ′‖2 (30)
‖ · ‖2 above denotes the Euclidean norm. Therefore, d(λ) is
K-Lipschitz continuous and Lipschitz constant K =
√
n. Let
λ∗ denote the maximiser of dual function d(λ), then
‖λ(t+1) − λ∗‖22 = ‖(λ(t) + ξkh(t))+ − λ∗‖22 (31)
≤ ‖λ(t) + ξkh(t) − λ∗‖22 (32)
= ‖λ(t) − λ∗‖22 + 2ξkh(t)T (λ(t) − λ∗) + ξ2k‖h(t)‖22 (33)
≤ ‖λ(t) − λ∗‖22 + 2ξk(d(λ(t))− d(λ∗)) + ξ2k‖h(t)‖22 (34)
Inequality (32) comes from the fact that projection of a point
onto R|O||V |
2
+ makes it closer to the optimal point in R
|O||V |2
+ .
Apply inequality (34) recursively, we have
‖λ(t+1) − λ∗‖22 ≤
‖λ(1) − λ∗‖22 + 2
k∑
i=1
ξi(d(λ
(i))− d(λ∗)) +
k∑
i=1
ξ2i ‖h(i)‖22
Because ‖λ(t+1) − λ∗‖22 ≥ 0 and
∑k
i=1 ξi > 0, and let
d(λ◦) = max0≤i<k d(λ(i)), then
2
k∑
i=1
ξi(d(λ
∗)− d(λ◦)) ≤ ‖λ(1) − λ∗‖22 +
k∑
i=1
ξ2i ‖h(i)‖22
=⇒ d(λ∗)− d(λ◦) ≤ ‖λ
(1) − λ∗‖22 +
∑k
i=1 ξ
2
i ‖h(i)‖22
2
∑k
i=1 ξi
=⇒ d(λ∗)− d(λ◦) ≤ ‖λ
(1) − λ∗‖22 +K2
∑k
i=1 ξ
2
i
2
∑k
i=1 ξi
d(λ∗)−d(λ◦)→ 0 if we choose a diminishing step size which
lets ξi → 0 and
∑∞
1 ξi = ∞, then
∑∞
1 ξ
2
i∑∞
1 ξi
= 0. (e.g. we can
let ξi = ξ0i , then
∑∞
1 ξi = ∞ and
∑∞
1 ξ
2
i =
pi2
6 .) Since
the duality gap is zero, eventually the primal problem will
converge to its optimum when its dual problem converges.
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